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Empirical research and theoretical accounts have traditionally emphasized the function of
the hippocampus in episodic memory. Here we draw attention to the importance of the
hippocampus to generalization, and focus on the neural representations and computations
that might underpin its role in tasks such as the paired associate inference (PAI)
paradigm. We make a principal distinction between two different mechanisms by which
the hippocampus may support generalization: an encoding-based mechanism that creates
overlapping representations which capture higher-order relationships between different
items [e.g., Temporal Context Model (TCM): Howard et al., 2005]—and a retrieval-based
model [Recurrence with Episodic Memory Results in Generalization (REMERGE): Kumaran
and McClelland, in press] that effectively computes these relationships at the point of
retrieval, through a recurrent mechanism that allows the dynamic interaction of multiple
pattern separated episodic codes. We also discuss what we refer to as transfer effects—a
more abstract example of generalization that has also been linked to the function of the
hippocampus. We consider how this phenomenon poses inherent challenges for models
such as TCM and REMERGE, and outline the potential applicability of a separate class
of models—hierarchical Bayesian models (HBMs) in this context. Our hope is that this
article will provide a basic framework within which to consider the theoretical mechanisms
underlying the role of the hippocampus in generalization, and at a minimum serve as a
stimulus for future work addressing issues that go to the heart of the function of the
hippocampus.
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INTRODUCTION
Empirical work in the ﬁeld of memory has tended to empha-
size the importance of the hippocampus to episodic memory, the
capacitytostoreandrecalluniqueepisodesfromthepast(Scoville
and Milner, 1957; Brown andAggleton, 2001; Burgess et al.,2002;
Tulving, 2002; Squire et al., 2004). This research focus has in
part been driven by prevailing computational perspectives of the
hippocampus as a fast learning system optimized for the rapid
storage and retrieval of input patterns, with interference between
similar memories minimized through the process of pattern sep-
aration (Marr, 1971; McNaughton and Morris, 1987; Treves and
Rolls, 1992; O’Reilly and McClelland, 1994; McClelland et al.,
1995; O’Reilly and Rudy, 2001; Norman and O’Reilly, 2003;
Burgess, 2006). Consequently, the role of the hippocampus in
generalization—whereby the structure of a set of related expe-
r i e n c e ss h a r i n gc o m m o nf e a t u r e si sc a p t u r e da n de x p l o i t e dt o
perform certain tasks—has been relatively understudied from an
empirical and theoretical perspective. Here we focus on these
issues, which provoke challenging questions about the underly-
ing hippocampal representations and computations that support
generalization.
TYPES OF GENERALIZATION
The term generalization refers to a broad array of phenom-
ena whereby past experience can be applied to novel settings. A
range of experimental paradigms have been developed to char-
acterize the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying gen-
eralization (Posner and Keele, 1968; Nosofsky, 1984; Shepard,
1987;KnowltonandSquire,1993;BunseyandEichenbaum,1996;
Eichenbaum, 2004; Preston et al., 2004; Shohamy and Wagner,
2008; Zeithamova and Preston, 2010). These includetasks involv-
ing stimulus generalization (e.g., generalizing reward expectation
from a 450Hz tone to a 500Hz tone), categorization (e.g., assign-
ing a new stimulus to a category based on its similarity to
previously seen stimuli) (Posner and Keele, 1968; Knowlton and
Squire, 1993), inferential tasks [e.g., paired associate inference
(PAI)] [see (Zeithamova et al., 2012) in this Research Topic], and
transfer effects (Kumaranet al., 2009). Itis important to note that
the hippocampus is not thought to be involved in all forms of
generalization—its role in categorization is controversial (Squire
et al., 2004; Zaki, 2004), and stimulus generalization does not
depend critically on the hippocampus, for reasons that we con-
sider in a later section. Empirical evidence, however, does suggest
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that the hippocampus playsanimportant role in aset of “inferen-
tial” tasks: the PAI (Bunsey and Eichenbaum, 1996; Preston et al.,
2004; Zeithamova and Preston, 2010), transitive inference [e.g.,
(Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997; Heckers et al., 2004; Greene et al.,
2006; Moses et al., 2006) ]a n da c q u i r e de q u i v a l e n c ep a r a d i g m s
(Coutureau et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003; Shohamy and Wagner,
2008). These experimental settings form the focus of the cur-
rent article: here successful performance depends on the ability
to appreciate the relationship between discrete items presented in
a set of related experiences [also see (Zeithamova et al., 2012)i n
this Research Topic].
PAIRED ASSOCIATE INFERENCE (PAI) PARADIGM
To frame the discussion of theoretical models of generalization,
we ﬁrst give a brief description of a recently used version of the
PAI task [Figure1A:s e e( Zeithamova and Preston, 2010)f o rf u r -
ther details]. Here participants were ﬁrst instructed to learn the
FIGURE 1 | Paired associative inference (PAI) task and schematic of
difference between encoding-based and retrieval-based models of
inference. (A) Overall design of PAI task: participants see overlapping
object pairs during study (e.g., AB, BC) and are required to generalize
during the test phase by exploiting indirect relationships between objects
(e.g., A—C): see main text for details. (B) Schematic of difference at the
representational level between encoding-based and retrieval-based models,
exempliﬁed by the relational theory and REMERGE model, respectively.
Left panel: encoding-based models (e.g., relational theory: Cohen and
Eichenbaum): A—C relationship represented through overlapping
conjunctive representations in the hippocampus which are created during
the study phase. In this highly simpliﬁed illustration, each circle denotes a
single neuron (or population of neurons)—red circles denote neurons which
code for study episode AB and yellow circles denote those coding for
episode BC. Orange circles denote neurons that participate in the
representation of both AB and BC episodes (cf. nodal codings—see main
text). Neuronal representations of AB and BC are overlapping, as if within a
“memory space” (see Eichenbaum et al., 1999). Right panel:
Retrieval-based models (e.g., REMERGE: Kumaran and McClelland)
emphasize a principle of pattern separation in the hippocampus—depicted
in extreme form as zero overlap between related episodes (AB, BC).
Indirect relationships are not actually represented, therefore, but computed
at the point of retrieval—which in REMERGE occurs through a recurrent
mechanism which supports the dynamic interaction of pattern separated
codes for related experiences.
association between many different pairs of objects, which were
presented as a single exposure during the training phase of the
experiment. Critically, objects were organized into triplets, such
that objects pairs were overlapping: for example object B was
paired with object A on one trial, but object C on another trial
(e.g., pairs AB, BC, XY, YZ). During the test phase of the experi-
ment, subjects needed to generalize: for example, when presented
with object A, they were required to select object C, (Figure1A)
over object Z—which was equally familiar (i.e., had been seen
once previously) but had been associated with a different set of
o b j e c t s( i . e . ,X ,Y ,a n dZ ) .
Generalization in the PAI task, therefore, involves exploiting
the relationship between individual items which are presented in
different training experiences (e.g., A—C), and has been shown
to depend on the hippocampus (Bunsey and Eichenbaum, 1996).
As such, we regard the PAI task as a prototypical example of
an inferential task that captures the basic essence of more com-
plex inferential tasks such as the transitivity paradigm, the latter
involving more distant relationships between individual items
(e.g., the B and E items in a six-item transitivity task). We, there-
fore, use the PAI task to provide a simple scenario in which
to illustrate the different ways in which the hippocampus may
contribute to generalization. Whilst we emphasize the concep-
tual similarity among inferential tasks (e.g., PAI and transitivity
paradigm), it is worth noting that there are substantial procedu-
ral differences between them. As such, we acknowledge that any
single mechanism is unlikely to be able to account for a capacity
forinferenceacrossthese settings: indeed,ithasoftenbeenargued
thatmultiplemechanisms maymediatesuccessfulperformancein
any given cognitive task (e.g., Poldrack and Packard, 2003).
OVERVIEW OF DIFFERENT MECHANISMS OF HIPPOCAMPAL
GENERALIZATION
We next consider possible mechanisms by which the hip-
pocampus may support generalization in the PAI task [also see
(Zeithamova et al., 2012) in this Research Topic]. Of note, it
is worth emphasizing that the phenomenon of interest, and the
underlying mechanisms we consider, relate to what could be
termed “rapid generalization” i.e., where generalization is based
on only limited numbers of trials often within a single exper-
imental session. In contrast, backpropagation neural networks
designed to simulate learning in the neocortex, though powerful
at discovering and representing the structure present in a set of
training experiences, are viewed to learn too slowly to merit con-
sideration in the context of tasks such as the PAI paradigm, being
more naturally suited to accounting for the acquisition of knowl-
edgeduring childhood (Rumelhart, 1990; McClellandet al.,1995;
Rogers and McClelland, 2004).
Our focus in subsequent sections is on providing a conceptual
overview of models of hippocampal generalization, and illus-
trating their key operating principles in the context of the PAI
task. The empirical work which forms the basis for these mod-
els is reviewed in a companion article in this Research Topic
(Zeithamova et al., 2012). In other work, the results of quan-
titative simulations of empirical data of the PAI and related
tasks arediscussed—in addition to divergent predictions between
these competing accounts [Temporal Context Model (TCM):
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Howard et al., 2005; Recurrence with Episodic Memory Results
in Generalization (REMERGE) (Kumaran and McClelland, in
press)].
We make a principal distinction between two classes of mod-
els, which exemplify the fundamentally different ways by which
the hippocampus might support generalization (Figure1B):
(1) “encoding-based overlap” models (Eichenbaum et al., 1999;
Howardetal.,2005;ShohamyandWagner,2008;Zeithamovaand
Preston, 2010) [also see (O’Reilly and Rudy, 2001)]: these create
representations during the training/study phase of the task that
capture the higher-order relationships between individual items
during training (e.g., A—C in the PAI task)—through the use of
overlapping neuronal codes for related episodes. (2) “retrieval-
based”models(KumaranandMcClelland, inpress) [alsosee (Wu
and Levy, 2001)]: in contrast to encoding-based models, these
models tend to emphasize the role of the hippocampusin pattern
separation,which effectively actstominimizethe overlapbetween
neural codes for related episodes during training. A capacity for
inference, therefore, emerges at the point of retrieval—in the
case of the REMERGE model (see below), through a recurrent
mechanism—which allows multiple pattern separated codes for
related conjunctive experiences (i.e., AB, BC pairs in PAI task) to
interact, and therefore support inference.
ENCODING-BASED OVERLAP MODELS OF INFERENCE
This class of qualitative (Eichenbaum et al., 1999; Shohamy and
Wagner, 2008; Zeithamova and Preston, 2010) and quantitative
(Howard et al., 2005) models, as well as other broadly related
perspectives [autoencoder model ofthe hippocampus(Gluckand
Myers, 1993; Gluck et al., 2003)], all suggest that it is the overlap
of hippocampal neural codes for related experiences that is crit-
ical to generalization. For instance, according to the integrative
encoding hypothesis (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008; Zeithamova
andPreston, 2010)itisarguedthatanewexperience(e.g.,thepair
of objects B and C in the PAI task) triggers the retrieval through
pattern completion of related episodes from the past (i.e., the
object pair AB). The concurrent activation of multiple episodes
(i.e., AB, BC) results in the formation ofanintegrated representa-
tioninthehippocampus(i.e.,ABC)thatdirectly linkstherelevant
items, andacts asabasisforgeneralizationandinference. Further,
according to the relational theory (Cohen andEichenbaum, 1993;
Eichenbaum et al., 1999), a prominent account that has long
espoused the importance of the hippocampus to generalization,
this process is viewed to occur as part of the networking of expe-
rience codes within a “memory space” (Eichenbaum et al., 1999)
(Figure1B). In this way, it is proposed that the structure of a set
of experiences may be captured and directly represented in the
hippocampus.
The TCM, originally developed to account for essential prop-
erties of behavioral data on tasks involving free recall (Kahana,
1996; Howard et al., 2005; Polyn and Kahana, 2008; Sederberg
et al., 2008; Polyn et al., 2009), can be considered a formal
encoding-based account of the hippocampal role in generaliza-
tion (Howard et al., 2005). Whilst links between the relational
theory and TCM have been previously noted (Wallenstein et al.,
1998; Howard et al., 2005), we are not aware of this point having
been made in relation to the more recently formulated integrative
encoding hypothesis (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008). Nevertheless,
itisworthnotingthattheintegrativeencodingaccount,likeTCM,
also emphasizes the point that generalization depends on the cre-
ation of new representations during training that in some way
capture the structure of the task (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008).
TEMPORAL CONTEXT MODEL (TCM)
Brieﬂy, TCM consists of two main layers, an item layer (f) and
ac o n t e x t u a ll a y e r( t )( Figure2A). Connections from the item to
context layer are speciﬁed in the matrix MFT, whilst those from
the context to item layer are stored in matrix MTF.A ss u c h ,t h e
presentation of items to the feature layer can cue the recall of pre-
vi ouss t at e sofc on t e x t ,an dc on t e x t uals t at e scanals ocuei t e m s .I n
TCM, therefore, the evolution of context is driven by the activa-
tion of items, rather than through random drift as is usually the
case in contextual models (e.g., see Polyn and Kahana, 2008 for
review). New learning occurs by updating matrices MFT and MTF
asitems arelinked,typicallythroughasimpleHebbianrule,tothe
FIGURE 2 | Temporal Context Model (TCM): overview of operation
and representations. (A) The TCM: Howard et al., 2005: there are two
main layers (Item, Context). Training trials are presented as input to the
item layer. MFT indicates connections between item and context layer. MTF
indicates connections between context and item layer. Hebbian learning
typically used to update these connections. See main text for details.
(B) Similarity (i.e., overlap) of representations over the context layer
induced by each object captures direct (e.g., A-B) and indirect associations
(e.g., A—C). White shading indicates a value of zero, and black a value of
one. Prior to the experiment, the contextual states activated by each
objects are assumed to be orthogonal to each other—denoted by black
shading only across the diagonal (upper ﬁgure). After the study phase, the
contextual representations induced by objects in a triplet (A, B, C)
have now become similar to each other—but not to objects in other triplets
(e.g., X, Y, Z). Critically, this is the case for contextual representations
associated with A and C objects [i.e., denoted by shading in [A, C] square:
even though these objects were presented in different study pairs (i.e., AB,
BC)]. It is worth noting that the similarity between objects presented in the
same study pair (e.g., A, B) is greater than that between different pairs (i.e.,
A, C). Note that the similarity between different objects reﬂects the dot
product between vectors specifying the contextual representation
associated with each object. See Howard et al., 2005 for implementational
details of the TCM model.
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current contextual state. In TCM, therefore, associations between
individual items (e.g., A and B in the PAI task) are mediated by
their shared context, rather than through direct item–item asso-
ciations. At the stage of retrieval, therefore, items are retrieved
as a function of their similarity to the current state of context.
Although many items may be retrieved to some extent by the
contextual cue, a competitive mechanism [e.g., leaky compet-
ing accumulator model (Sederberg et al., 2008), or luce choice
rule (Polyn and Kahana, 2008)], ensures that only one item is
recalled at a time. The winning item in turn is used as a cue to
the contextual layer.
Whilst initially intended as a model of episodic memory, TCM
hasmorerecentlybeenappliedtogeneralization-relatedphenom-
ena such asthe PAI paradigmsand transitive inference paradigms
(Howardetal.,2005).Weillustratethebasicmechanism bywhich
TCM works in the setting of the PAI task (Figure2B): during the
study phase, experiences involving the AB pair induce new learn-
ing in the associative connections between item and contextual
layersuchthatthecontextualrepresentationassociatedwithitems
A and B comes to shares common features due to their temporal
co-occurrence. Importantly, this process means that the contex-
tual states associated with non-adjacent items (e.g., A and C) also
evolves through learning to be similar to one another: a BC pair,
for example, tends to cue the reinstatement of the contextual state
associated with the presentation of the AB pair.Consequently, the
contextual state to which item C becomes bound shares features
with that of item A. Over the course of the study phase, there-
fore, the similarity structure of the contextual states cued by each
of the individual items comes to reﬂect the indirect relationships
between items in overlapping pairs: e.g., the contextual state cued
by object A is more similar to that cued by object C (cf. object Z).
Importantly, new item-contextual learning in the model is
proposed to be hippocampal-dependent, which is therefore,
viewed to be critical to the development of representations that
capture the higher-order structure of the task—and therefore,
generalization.
TCM, therefore, forms overlapping item-contextual repre-
sentations during the study phase of the PAI paradigm that
code the indirect relationships between items in adjacent pairs
(e.g., A—C). Notably,the generalizationcapacityofTCMextends
beyond the PAI task—for example to the transitive inference task,
whereTCMisabletocapturemoredistantrelationsbetween indi-
vidual items within a linear hierarchy (e.g., B and E). Indeed,
TCM is also not restricted to supporting the representation of
linear structures, and can be shown to capture the higher order
structure of semantic datasets (Howard et al., 2010), in a fash-
ion that bears relation to the technique of latent semantic analysis
(see Howard et al., 2005).
ENCODING-BASED MODELS vs. PATTERN SEPARATION?
Encoding-based models, therefore, propose that the hippocam-
pus is critical to generalization because it creates representations
that directly reﬂect the relationships between items presented in
a set of experiences—through the use of overlapping neuronal
codes [cf. nodal codings: (Eichenbaum et al., 1999)] that are
“similarity-capturing” in nature. Notably, however, such a coding
scheme contrasts markedly with highly inﬂuential computational
accounts arguing that the hippocampus, and in particular the DG
subregion (Leutgeb et al., 2007; Deng et al., 2010), acts to orthog-
onalize similar input patterns—effectively using a “similarity-
reducing” coding scheme to discard the commonalities between
related experiences (e.g., AB, BC)—so as to minimize interfer-
encewithinasystem optimizedforepisodicmemory(Marr,1971;
McNaughton and Morris, 1987; Treves and Rolls, 1992; O’Reilly
and McClelland, 1994; McClelland et al., 1995). Indeed, the spe-
ciﬁc anatomical [i.e., divergent projection from the downstream
entorhinal cortex(ERC)]andphysiologicalproperties(i.e.,sparse
activity) of the dentate gyrus have been often viewed as making
this subregion of the hippocampus ideally suited to performing
the process of orthogonalization/pattern separation (Treves and
Rolls, 1992). Though in reality hippocampal pattern separation
is not viewed to be perfect, the apparent tension between com-
putational accounts of the hippocampus as an episodic memory
system and encoding-based models of generalization raises the
question ofwhether efﬁcient generalizationmightnevertheless be
possible in the context ofpattern separated episodic codes viewed
to exist within the hippocampus. In the next section, we pro-
vide a high-level overview of the essential operating principles of
a recently developed retrieval-based model of the hippocampal
contribution to inference: REMERGE(KumaranandMcClelland,
in press), which suggests that this may be the case.
RETRIEVAL-BASED MODELS OF INFERENCE
Crucially REMERGE retains a principle of pattern separation in
the hippocampus and involves a recurrent mechanism operat-
ing at the retrieval stage that supports the dynamic interaction of
multiple pattern separated codes for related experiences (e.g., AB,
BC).Whilstapreviousretrieval-basedmodelbasedonthestorage
of temporal sequences, has been shown to be perform generaliza-
tion, this has only been demonstrated within a speciﬁc paradigm
(i.e., the transitive inference task)—leaving open the question of
whether a capacity for generalization would be supported in a
wider setting (Wu and Levy, 2001).
The core architecture of our model, which reﬂects a synthesis
of interactive activation competitive (IAC) networks (McClelland
and Rumelhart, 1981) and exemplar models of memory (Medin
and Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984; Hintzman, 1986), can be
regarded as a simpliﬁcation of the multi-stage circuitry of the
hippocampal system into two principal layers: a feature layer
and a conjunctive layer, broadly ascribed to the ERC and
the hippocampus proper, respectively. The model instantiates
key principles shared by prevailing computational accounts of
the hippocampus: (1) pattern separated representations in the
dentate gyrus/CA3 regions of the hippocampus (Marr, 1971;
McNaughton and Morris, 1987; Treves and Rolls, 1992; O’Reilly
and McClelland, 1994; McClelland et al., 1995)—each individ-
ual training episode (e.g., AB, BC, XY, YZ in the PAI task)
is represented in the network by a localist unit in the con-
junctive layer (see Figure3)—mirroring a principle of optimal
pattern separation in the hippocampus, where conjunctive codes
for related experiences are rendered orthogonal to one another.
(2) Componential codes in neocortical regions such as the ERC
(e.g., coding for items A, B, C, X, Y, Z in the PAI task)—which
are ascribed to the feature layer of the model, and viewed to
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FIGURE 3 | REMERGE model: schematic of evolution of network
activity during a ACZ test trial in the paired associate inference task.
Each stage illustrates pattern of network activity over feature layer (upper)
and conjunctive layer (lower), during key phases of processing (see main
text for details). Feature layer units (upper) denote individual objects (i.e., A,
B, C, X, Y, Z). Conjunctive layer units (lower) code pairs of objects presented
during the study phase of the experiment, in localist fashion (i.e., AB, BC,
XY, YZ). Feature layer and conjunctive layer connected by recurrent
excitatory connections. Response layer not shown. Unit activity denoted by
color: from gray (low activity) to red (high activity). Details of transfer
functions and parameters used in the network, and quantitative simulations
of empirical data are described elsewhere (Kumaran and McClelland, in
press).
derive from the operation of a slow-learning neocortical system
(McClelland et al., 1995; McClelland and Goddard, 1996).
The model, however, diverges from traditional perspectives of
the hippocampal system as a unidirectional feedforward circuit,
where information is thought to ﬂow from associational areas of
t h en e o c o r t e xi nas i n g l ep a s st h r o u g ht h eE R C( s u p e r ﬁ c i a ll a y -
ers)/DG/CA3/CA1/subiculum in sequential stages, ﬁnally, being
projected via the deep layers of the ERC back to the neocortex
(Treves and Rolls, 1992; Amaral and Lavenex, 2006). Critically,
therefore, REMERGE incorporates a principle of “big-loop”
recurrence, between thehippocampusproper(e.g.,DG/CA3)and
neocortical regions such as the ERC, which allows a recircula-
tion of the output as a successive input to the system. Notably,
our notion of big-loop recurrence draws on anatomical and
physiologicalevidence—for example, the anatomicalconnections
known to exist between the superﬁcial and deep layers of the ERC
(van Strien et al., 2009)—and differs from the internal recur-
rence known to exist within the CA3 region, which has been
presumed to exist within a globally unidirectional (cf. recurrent)
hippocampal system. Whilst internal CA3 recurrence is agreed to
be critical to the reinstatement (i.e., pattern completion) of indi-
vidual episodic memories (Marr, 1971; Treves and Rolls, 1992;
McClelland et al., 1995; Nakazawa et al., 2003; Burgess, 2006),
big-loop recurrence is needed to allow multiple pattern separated
codes for related conjunctive experiences to interact in the service
of generalization (see below).
To bring out more clearlythe mechanism by which generaliza-
tion is achieved, we consider how REMERGE performs inference
in the PAI task (Figure3), during an ACZ test trial (Figure1A)
where successful performance requires the choiceof object C over
object Z, based on the indirect association of objects A and C.
Whilst in reality, the network operates continuously over a num-
ber of timesteps (e.g., 300), for illustrative purposes we provide
a conceptual description of the activity patterns that arise in the
network over successive key stages of processing.
Instage1(Figure3:topleft), thepresentationofexternalinput
to the A, C, and Z units on the feature layer causes the activity of
these units to rise. In stage 2 (Figure3: bottom left), the activ-
ity of these feature units ﬂows forward to the conjunctive layer
and drives a rise in activation of three conjunctive units: AB, BC,
YZ—all ofwhich codefor training episodes that shareonefeature
with the test input (i.e., ACZ). Indeed, the initially equal activity
of these three units can be interpreted in more formal terms as
reﬂecting the equivalent similarity of each of the relevant training
episodes to the current test input ascomputed by a classicalexem-
plarmodels(Nosofsky, 1984). Whathappensin stage 3(Figure3:
top right) is critical to the network’s ability to perform inference:
the recurrent excitatory connections allow the pattern of activ-
ity over the conjunctive layer to drive a new pattern of activity
over the feature layer that includes activation of the B and Y units
which do not receive any external inputs. Critically, the activity
of the B unit in the feature layer rises above that of the Y unit
because the B unit receives convergent drive from both the AB
a n dB Cc o n j u n c t i v eu n i t s( c f .t h eYu n i t — o n l yi n p u tf r o mY Z
unit). In stage 4 (Figure3: bottom right), the greater activity of
the B (cf. Y) unit combined with a form of inhibitory compe-
tition operating over the conjunctive layer causes the activity of
the AB and BC conjunctive units to rise above that of the YZ
and XY, units. It is this graded pattern of activity over multiple
conjunctive units that leads the network to correctly choose C
over Z in the response layer (not shown), with the greater activ-
ity of the BC unit, as compared to the YZ unit, resulting in the
selection of C.
More formally, the operation of the network can be inter-
preted as involving a process of recurrent similarity computation:
whereby similarity computation to be performed not only on
externally presented sensory inputs, as is the case in classical
exemplar models in which REMERGE is grounded (Nosofsky,
1984), but also on new feature layer activity patterns constructed
by the network. In this respect, it is worth noting that a classi-
calexemplar model (Nosofsky, 1984)wouldnot typicallysupport
a capacity for inference in the PAI task: processing would effec-
tively be complete in such a model at stage 2 (Figure3), resulting
an equal tendency to choose C or Z in the ACZ trial. REMERGE
is only able to support inference in the PAI and related tasks
through the operation of recurrence, which effectively allows it to
exploit the higher-order structure present within a set of related
episodeswhere pairwisesimilarities aloneare uninformative(also
see below).
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Our aim here has been to provide an intuitive overview of
how REMERGE operates, by illustrating the basic mechanism by
which it performs inference using the setting of the PAI task.
In other work, we consider the performance of REMERGE in
relation to empirical data in the PAI, acquired equivalence and
transitive inference tasks, as well as other generalization-related
phenomena [e.g., categorization (Kumaran and McClelland, in
press)]. There, we also consider other implications of our model.
We discuss how REMERGE offers a parsimonious mechanism for
howacapacityforinference mayemerge throughtraining[e.g., in
the transitive inference task (Moses et al., 2006)], simply through
anincrease in the strength of weights coding individualmemories
formed during the training/study phase (e.g., AB, BC). We also
suggest that the reason why some subjects generalize successfully,
and others poorly, in such tasks [e.g., in the acquired equiva-
lence and PAI tasks (Shohamy and Wagner, 2008; Zeithamova
and Preston, 2010)] maybe accounted for by positing a difference
the strength of premise pair memories—rather than necessitating
a qualitative difference in terms of the nature of neural rep-
resentations (i.e., integrated representations in the good group
only: Shohamy and Wagner, 2008). Our model also has implica-
tions for perspectives on the nature and function of hippocampal
replay activity that occurs during ofﬂine periods (e.g., slow-wave
sleep). Conventionally, hippocampal replay activity is thought to
consist of the reactivation of a CA3 ensemble representing a sin-
gle conjunctive experience (e.g., sequence of locations visited),
which is transmitted to the neocortex (Buzsaki, 1989; Wilson and
McNaughton, 1994; McClelland et al., 1995; O’Neill et al., 2010).
Ourperspective, which holdsbig-looprecurrencyascentraltothe
function of the hippocampal system, predicts that hippocampal
replay activity may under certain conditions be “generalized” in
nature, reﬂecting the replay of multiple-related episodes, a notion
thatreceives initial supportfromempiricalevidence(Gupta et al.,
2010).
ENCODING-BASED vs. RETRIEVAL-BASED MECHANISMS
We have sought to highlight that REMERGE achieves inference
in a fundamentally different fashion from the class of encoding-
based models described above. In REMERGE, inference can be
considered as an emergent phenomenon—through the linkage of
related pattern separated episodes occurring “on the ﬂy,” within
a dynamically created memory space that is effectively created at
the point of retrieval (i.e., during a test trial) through recurrence.
In contrast to encoding-based models (Eichenbaum et al., 1999;
Howard et al., 2005; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008), therefore,
the distant relationship between items experienced in different
episodes (e.g., A—C) is not actually represented in any part of
the REMERGE network—nor is the relationship between adja-
cent study episodes (e.g., AB, BC) captured through the actual
overlap of their respective conjunctive codes.
It is important, however, to bear in mind that despite their
fundamental differences, encoding- and retrieval-based models
have much in common: indeed, REMERGE can be considered to
marry key insights of a relational view of memory (Cohen and
Eichenbaum, 1993; Eichenbaum et al., 1999; Eichenbaum, 2004)
(i.e., compositionality of conjunctive memories, critical contri-
bution of the hippocampus to generalization through linking of
episodes within a memory space) with prevailing computational
theories that the hippocampus is optimized to be an efﬁcient
episodic memory system (i.e., rapid learning of pattern sep-
arated conjunctive representations) (Marr, 1971; McNaughton
and Morris, 1987; McClelland et al., 1995). Further, it may be
the case that in reality the distinction between retrieval-based
and encoding-based models is not absolute—indeed, general-
ized replay activity occurring within a recurrent hippocampal
system (see above) may facilitate the recombination of multiple-
related episode, which could potentially result in the creation
of new representations that directly capture distant relationships
between items (cf. encoding-based mechanisms) (see Kumaran
and McClelland, in press).
At a more basic level, encoding and retrieval-based mecha-
nisms both emphasize thatthe hippocampusis critical to general-
ization in tasks that involve exploiting the higher-order structure
present within a set of tasks. This point speaks to the question
of why certain forms of generalization (e.g., stimulus general-
ization, categorization) seem to be relatively, though perhaps
not entirely (Zaki, 2004), hippocampal-independent—and other
forms to rely critically upon the hippocampus (e.g., PAI). What
is needed in inferential tasks, but not tasks such as categorization
(Squire et al., 2004)[ b u ts e e( Zaki, 2004)], is the ability to detect
higher-order similarities, or relationships, which exist between
items (e.g., A—C) presented within a structured set of episodes.
We suggest that this capacity, which REMERGE formally pro-
vides through the process of recurrent similarity computation,
and which encoding-basedmodels morebroadlycapturethrough
the use of overlapping representations, may explain the primary
contribution of the hippocampus to inference.
TRANSFER EFFECTS: A DIFFERENT FORM OF
GENERALIZATION
In the last section, we consider a quite different form of gen-
eralization from that examined thus far—a phenomenon which
we refer to as “transfer,” which has also recently been linked to
the function of the hippocampus (Kumaran et al., 2009). We do
this to examine whether, and how, models of hippocampal infer-
ence suchasTCMandREMERGEarecapableofgeneralizationin
such a setting, andto consider alternative schemes for successfully
solving this kind of problem.
We illustrate the essence of a transfer effect with a hypothetical
experiment using the transitive inference task, an intuitive task
in which to consider this phenomenon—indeed one might also
construct an analogous scenario using the PAI task. Participants
would ﬁrst learn the linear ordering of a set of items in the
“initial” experimental session [see (Zeithamova et al., 2012)f o r
overview of the transitive inference task]. Then one could exam-
ine their ability to transfer their performance to a new setting
where the taskstructure isthe same (i.e.,linear hierarchy), butthe
stimuli novel. If the performance of participants in the perceptu-
ally novel setting was signiﬁcantly improved (cf. initial session),
over and above any non-speciﬁc skill effect, then this would sug-
gest that they had acquired knowledge about the structure of
the task (i.e., linear hierarchy) in the initial session which could
be transferred to the perceptually novel setting. Whilst no such
experiments have been performed to our knowledge using the
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transitive, PAI, or acquired equivalence tasks—successful trans-
fer has been demonstrated in a conceptually related experimental
task which has also been shown to be hippocampal-dependent:
here we term this task the “associative weather prediction (AWP)
task” (Kumaran et al., 2009) (also see: Kumaran et al., 2007).
We restrict our focus to the aspects of this experiment rele-
vant to the issue of transfer: in the intial session, participants
were required to learn the outcome (i.e., sun or rain) associ-
ated with a set of individual patterns, created from combina-
tions of four different fractals (Figure4A). Notably, there was
an underlying task structure that efﬁciently captured the rel-
evant contingencies—e.g., that fractal 1 on the left predicted
sun regardless of the identity of the central shape. Participants
demonstrated a behavioral transfer effect that was evident as
FIGURE 4 | Associative weather prediction task: task structure and
evidence that neural activity in hippocampus correlates with transfer
ability (Kumaran et al., 2009). (A) Depiction of eight patterns presented
during training: the terms “spatial” and “non-spatial” refer to the type of
information which determines the outcome (i.e., shape-location, or
shape-shape, respectively). (B) Behavioral evidence of superior performance
in New session (left). Neural activity in left posterior hippocampus
shows greater correlation with performance in New session cf. Initial
session (right). Signiﬁcant between-subjects correlation between
activity in left hippocampus (averaged across anatomical ROI) during Initial
session and performance in New session (see Kumaran et al., 2009 for
details).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 157 | 7Kumaran The hippocampus and generalization
superior learning performance in a perceptually novel (“new”)
session—where the fractals were novel, though critically the
underlying task structure the same. Interestingly, this behavioral
transfer effect could be linked to neural activity in the hip-
pocampusin two ways(Figure4B)( Kumaranet al., 2009): ﬁrstly,
activity in the left hippocampus during the initial session showed
a signiﬁcant between-subject correlation with performance in the
New session. Importantly, this correlation wasspeciﬁc to transfer,
andremained signiﬁcant evenonceeffects ofperformanceduring
the Initial session had been partialled out. Further, we observed
that activity in the left posterior hippocampus showed a signif-
icantly stronger correlation with successful performance during
the New (cf. Initial) session (for further discussion, see Kumaran
and McClelland, in press).
These ﬁndings provide initial evidence implicating the hip-
pocampusinsupporting generalizationto asetting that isentirely
novel from a perceptual point of view, but shares the same
abstract underlying structure. Whilst it would be illuminating to
test the role of the hippocampus in supporting transfer in other
settings, perhapsincludinginferentialtaskssuchasthetransitivity
paradigm, it is interesting to ask how this kind of generalization
phenomena might be mediated, and in particular to consider this
question in relation to the models already discussed (i.e., TCM,
REMERGE).
A key issue in this respect is that transfer effects of this type
must depend in some way on abstract representations of the
task structure that are not inherently linked to speciﬁc stim-
uli (“stimulus-bound”). This poses a substantial challenge for
the encoding-based and retrieval-based models outlined: both
REMERGE and TCM are by nature stimulus-bound, a property
often sharedbyconnectionist style models ofcognition [although
see (Hinton et al., 1986; Flusberg et al., 2011)]. For example,
TCM, through the very nature of its operation, derives rep-
resentations of the task structure that are intimately linked to
the actual stimuli experienced during the training phase (i.e.,
items A, B, C ... F in a transitivity paradigm) (Howard et al.,
2005). This raises the question of how such models could account
for transfer effects. One speculative possibility is that interac-
tions between the hippocampus and another region such as the
prefrontal cortex might perhaps allow the stimulus-bound repre-
sentations derived by TCM or REMERGE to be transformed into
a more abstract coding scheme, for example one that is symbolic
in form (cf. language), that would then be useful for supporting
transfer effects.
HIERARCHICAL BAYESIAN MODEL
Whilst extensions of REMERGE and TCM could potentially be
developed to encompass transfer effects, it is worth noting that
a class of models exists that more naturally account for this
phenomena—hierarchical Bayesian models [HBMs: (Kemp and
Tenenbaum, 2008)] (Figure5). Though the HBM developed by
Kemp and Tenenbaum has generally been considered in a dif-
ferent context—for example how conceptual knowledge (e.g.,
the properties of different animals) is acquired and represented
(Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008, 2009)—we suggest that they could
be fruitfully applied to the kinds of rapid generalization tasks
discussed in this article. Indeed, they would seem to have a
FIGURE 5 | Schematic of Hierarchical Bayesian Model (HBM), as
applied to transitive inference task. Overview of the generative HBM of
Kemp and Tenenbaum (2008): the model is speciﬁed at two levels: a high
“structure” level that speciﬁes the type of structure that best explains
data—in this case a hierarchy of kanji characters (e.g., used in experiment
by Greene et al., 2006)—a generative process based on graph grammars is
used to create a library of possible structures. A lower “instance” level
speciﬁes the exact version of the structure that is most likely given the
data—in this case A>B>C>D>E. The model simultaneously ﬁnds the best
structure and instance that likely accounts for the data. Upward arrows
indicate the generative nature of the HBM.
number of attractive features, which make them well suited to
offering insights into howtransfer effects in the AWP paradigm—
and other tasks such as the transitive inference paradigm—could
potentially be accounted for.
We provide a high level overview of the key principles of the
HBM developed by Kemp and Tenenbaum (2008). The key ques-
tion addressed by the model is how structure present in a set of
data can be discovered. The problem is posed at two separate lev-
els (Figure5): the higher level problem is to identify the type of
structural form (e.g., hierarchy, tree, cluster) with the lower level
problem then to deﬁne the instance ofthis form thatbest explains
the available data. A simple generative model is used to “grow”
structural forms, using a language of graph grammars. This pro-
cess canbeusedtoproducesimplestructures suchaslinearorders
and trees, as well as more complex forms. The discovery of struc-
ture is then speciﬁed computationally as a process of probabilis-
tic inference, involving simultaneously ﬁnding the appropriate
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structure and “instance” that best explain the observed data. As is
typically the case in Bayesian inference, simpler models are pre-
ferred over more complex models. As an example, the authors
consider data relating to the attributes of a number of species of
animals, actually obtained from human judgments. The model
successfully ﬁnds that the structural form that best explains the
data is a tree, and deﬁnes the instance of this tree which correctly
represents categories atdifferent levels ofresolution (e.g., birds vs.
primates,insects vs.ﬂyinginsects) (KempandTenenbaum,2008).
Of note, the model can handle different types of data: from those
denoting the attributes of items, to relational data, and similarity
matrices.
The HBM, therefore, beneﬁts from speciﬁcation at both an
abstract (i.e., type of structure) and a stimulus-bound (i.e.,
instance) level. In this way, they would seem to provide an intu-
itively appealing way of accounting for the kinds of abstract
transfer effects discussed above. In the AWP task, or putatively
in the transitivity paradigm, speeded learning in the New ses-
sion might be simulated by increasing the prior (i.e., likelihood)
over the type of structure which was found to best capture the
relationship between different experiences in the Initial session.
Armed with this prior knowledge, participants might more read-
ily be able to solve the AWP task in the New session, given that
the problem has now been reduced to discovering the appro-
priate instance (i.e., involving perceptually novel fractals) of a
known form.
Whilst HBMs are powerful engines of structure discovery in
high dimensional datasets, and may potentially offer insights into
the mechanisms underlying behavioral transfer effects, it is also
important to bear in mind possible limitations: ﬁrstly, the abil-
ity of HBMs to produce an inﬁnite number of structural forms,
and weight these hypotheses appropriatelyto reﬂect prior knowl-
edge, canbe both an advantage in terms of offering ﬂexibility, but
also raises questions. For example, one could ask how the space
of possible hypotheses and the prior probabilitydistribution over
them is speciﬁed. Secondly, HBMs offer an abstract description
of the basic algorithms necessary to perform inference, akin to
Marr’s computational level (Marr, 1971; McClelland et al., 2010).
As such they are agnostic with regards to the underlying cognitive
mechanisms and neural circuitry that supports such processes.
In their present form, therefore, Bayesian probabilistic models
do not speak to the issue of how the hippocampus might sup-
port transfer effects. In contrast REMERGE and TCM, which
can both be implemented using a connectionist neural network
scheme [e.g., TCM: (Sederberg et al., 2008)], have been more
closely linked to the function of the hippocampus (Howard et al.,
2005; Kumaran and McClelland, in press). As such, the potential
advantages and disadvantages of HBMs can be related to a wider
debate on the relative virtues of structured probabilistic and con-
nectionist style models e.g., (McClelland et al., 2010)—indeed,
it will be important for future work to consider whether, and
how, a synthesis of ideas from both classes of models may con-
tribute to a wider understanding of the mechanisms underlying
the hippocampal contribution to generalization.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this article, we have emphasized the importance of the hip-
pocampus to generalization, in contrast to traditional perspec-
tives that have long focussed on its role in episodic memory. We
have considered two basic classes of mechanisms that have been
proposed to underpin the hippocampal contribution to gener-
alization, and highlighted the fundamental differences between
these models in the context of a prototypical inferential task, the
PAI task. The aim has been to provide a conceptual overview
of two formal models, which exemplify the principal distinction
made between encoding-based and retrieval-based mechanisms:
the TCM and REMERGE, respectively. Our hope is that this arti-
cle will provide a basic framework within which to consider the
theoretical mechanisms underlying the role of the hippocampus
in generalization, and stimulate future empirical and theoretical
work in this relatively understudied area.
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